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Abstract:
“The Effects of Population Aging on Optimal Redistributive Taxes in an Overlapping
Generations Model”
by
Craig Brett
The impact of population aging on the steady state solution to a Ordover and Phelps
(1979) overlapping generations optimal nonlinear income tax problem with two types
of workers and quasilinear-in-leisure preferences is investigated. A decrease in the rate
of population growth, which leads to an aging population, increases the relative price
of consumption per person in retirement, which tends to decrease optimal consumption
for retirees of both skill types. It is also shown that the optimal steady state rate of
interest equals the rate of population growth. As a result, the steady state interest
rate unambiguously declines when the rate of population growth declines. The resulting
adjustments in production plans has an ambiguous effect on the aggregate wage rate.
This article identifies factors contributing to an increase in the aggregate wage when
the population ages, namely normality of consumption in retirement, complementarity
between capital and labor in production, and a large capital deepening effect relative to
the increase in dependency owing to demographic change. Depending on the sign of this
wage effect, ambiguities may arise in the direction of change in the optimal steady state
consumption and production plans. It is also shown that the optimal marginal income
tax rates are independent of the rate of population growth.
JEL classification: D82, H21
Keywords: optimal income taxation, overlapping generations model, population aging
1 Introduction
The effects of population aging on public finances are potentially profound. As Visco
(2001) argues, population aging is expected to exert upward pressure on government
expenditure. These pressures on expenditure may be cause for policy concern in that
they call for redistribution of resources among generations.1 Moreover, governments
must call upon distortionary taxation to fund expenditures. Thus, it is also important
to understand how population aging affects the revenue side of the public budget.
This article addresses the effects of population aging on optimal distortionary income
taxes using a model that embeds the Mirrlees (1971) personal income tax framework into
an overlapping generations model. The distortionary effects of personal income taxation
are modeled as arising out of information asymmetry between the taxation authority and
individuals. The population of workers is divided into two classes, differing in exogenous
labor productivity. The two types of workers are assumed to be perfect substitutes in
production. Following the standard set of assumptions, the taxation authority is assumed
to observe only market earnings, which are a mixture of innate ability and hours of work.
Because the goal of this paper is to examine the effects of parameter changes on the
optimal tax schedule, and not to elaborate on further properties of the tax schedule
itself, the government is assumed to use only the nonlinear income tax to further its
redistributive goals.
The dynamic structure is equally simple, deriving in a straightforward way from a
commonly used deterministic overlapping generations model. Population aging is mod-
eled by allowing the number of workers in each generation to grow at a constant rate
per generation, and allowing the rate of growth of new workers to decline. The model is
very similar to the one used by Ordover and Phelps (1979) to describe optimal income
taxes with a continuum of workers.2 A two–class version of the Ordover-Phelps model,
1See, however, McDaniel (2003) for a critical assessment of “apocalyptic demography” in the Cana-
dian context.
2See Myles (1995, pp. 509–514) for a textbook treatment of this analysis.
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allowing for the possibility of endogenous relative wages, was introduced by Pirttila¨ and
Tuomala (2001) in order to analyze capital taxation and public good provision.
The effects of population aging are demonstrated by deriving how the steady state
optimal income tax changes in response to a change in the rate of population growth.
The steady state envisioned is one in which the capital per worker of each type is constant
over time. Given the assumptions on technology, capital per unit of labor in efficiency
units is constant at a steady state. Confining attention to changes in steady states ren-
ders the analysis similar in form and in spirit to the literature on the comparative statics
of nonlinear taxation, pioneered by Weymark (1987) and recently extended by Hamilton
and Pestieau (2005), Boadway and Pestieau (2007), Simula (2007), Brett and Weymark
(2008a), and Brett and Weymark (2008c). The overlapping generations framework en-
dogenizes many of the variables that are assumed to be exogenous in a static nonlinear
income tax framework, such as the amount of labor in efficiency units required to pro-
duce one unit of the consumption good. However, the relative wage rates and the rate
of population growth are exogenous. Thus, it is reasonable to carry out comparative
steady state analysis with respect to these variables. I choose not to consider the effects
of changes in the relative wage rate, because the model is similar enough to that of Wey-
mark (1987) and Brett and Weymark (2008a) that their insights should carry over with
only minor modifications. Changes in the age structure of the population, however, have
yet to receive attention in the nonlinear taxation literature.
Population aging has multiple effects on the model economy presented in this arti-
cle. There is the usual capital deepening effect, whereby the capital stock is used in
conjunction with relatively fewer workers. There is also the standard dependency effect,
as the relative number of retirees increases. This effect also acts to increase the price
of consumption in retirement relative to consumption when working. Because relative
wages are fixed and preferences are assumed to be separable between labor and consump-
tion, there are no capital market distortions in the steady state optimum. In particular,
the optimal steady state rate of interest equals the rate of population growth. Thus,
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population aging leads to a decline in the optimal steady state interest rate. There is
an ambiguous effect on the aggregate wage rate. I show that the aggregate wage tends
to increase when the population ages when some combination of the following factors is
sufficiently strong in the neighborhood of the initial steady state optimum: normality of
consumption in retirement, complementarity between capital and labor in production, or
a large capital deepening effect relative to the increase in dependency.
When the wage rate increases in response to population aging, few unambiguous
comparative steady state results are available. The implicit marginal income tax rates
remain unchanged. In addition, consumption when working increases under the addi-
tional assumption of time-separable utility. However, when the wage rate decreases in
response to population aging (due, for example, to a large dependency effect) and utility
is time-separable, it is possible to deduce the direction of change in most of the variables
of interest: consumption falls for individuals of both skill types when working and when
retired; the per-capita capital stock and aggregate effective labor rise; optimal implicit
marginal income tax rates remain unchanged.
The effects of population aging on steady state consumption has received attention in
models with fixed per-person labor supply, time-separable utility and no within-cohort
heterogeneity. Cutler et al. (1990) provide a detailed analysis of anticipated changes in
steady state consumption owing to demographic changes in the United States. Meijdam
and Verbon (1997) compute the effects of an aging population on steady state consump-
tion in the presence of public pension schemes. In their model, only capital deepening
and dependency effects arise, with the latter dominating. Consequently, population aging
reduces steady state consumption.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description
of the model, paying careful attention to the information assumptions contained therein.
Section 3 derives some qualitative features of optimal taxation in this environment. Sec-
tion 4 provides a mathematical formulation of the comparison among steady states and
offers verbal statements of the effects of population aging on the optimal tax schedule.
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Some concluding remarks are then offered. Proofs are gathered in an Appendix.
2 The Model
There are two types of workers born each period. During the first period of their
lives, they supply labor elastically and they consume. In the second period of life, each
individual retires. Within a generation, individuals differ in productivity. Denote the
productivity of a person of type i by ai, i = 1, 2, a1 < a2.
3 Thus, if a person supplies
li units of labor, her effective labor is yi := aili. At any date (apart from the start–
up period), t, the following types of individuals are alive: young individuals, some of
type a1,the others with productivity a2; retired individuals, born at time t− 1, living off
the proceeds of their savings. I assume that the number of workers varies from period-
to-period, but that the within-period composition of workers is fixed. For simplicity, I
assume that exactly half the workers in each time period are of type 1, and denote the
number of such workers by N t. The number of workers of each type evolves according to
the equation
N t = (1 + n)N t−1, (1)
which states that the population grows at a constant rate n. The focus of this paper is
to investigate how changes in n affect the optimal tax system in the steady state.
Total output at any date t is a function of the capital stock, Kt, and total effective
labor,
Y t := N t(yt1 + y
t
2). (2)
Let F (Kt, Y t) be the production function, assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale
and to be strictly concave, with isoquants that do not intersect the coordinated axes,
for all positive levels of output. The prices of inputs are determined by the profit-
3Throughout this analysis, subscripts are used to denote the type of an individual and superscripts
denote the date of birth of an individual. Quantities denoted without subscripts are within-period
aggregates.
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maximization conditions
rt = Fk(k
t, yt); wt = Fy(k
t, yt), (3)
where wt is the price of effective labor and rt is the rental price of capital. The before-tax
income of an individual is given by
zti := w
tail
t
i = w
tyti . (4)
Total consumption at time t is made up of consumption by the young born at that
date, denoted by the symbol c, and the spending in retirement of those born at date t−1,
denoted by x. Depreciation is assumed away, so that the capital stock evolves according
to the equation
Kt+1 = F (Kt, Y t) +Kt −N t(ct1 + ct2)−N t−1(xt−11 + xt−12 ). (5)
That is, capital next period equals current output plus current capital less total con-
sumption of those currently alive. Because production exhibits constant returns to scale,
the evolution of the capital stock per young worker of each type can be tracked with the
equation
(1 + n)kt+1 = f(kt, yt) + kt − ct1 − ct2 −
1
1 + n
(xt−11 + x
t−1
2 ), (6)
where lowercase quantities are their respective uppercase analogs divided by N t and
f(kt, yt) = F
(Kt
N t
,
Y t
N t
)
=
1
N t
F (Kt, Y t). (7)
The government can observe both z and w, but cannot observe l or a. This accords
with the standard assumptions of nonlinear tax theory. It is equivalent to say that
the planner can observe y. Implicitly, then, the planner can also observe k. Because
l is unobserved, the planner must resort to distortionary taxation. Exactly which tax
instruments are available to the planner depend on the further assumptions one makes
about the use of non-income information. It is assumed that the planner knows the age
of each individual, so that the young cannot pretend to be old, nor can the old pretend
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to be young. The old do not work, so there is no direct interaction between them and
the income tax schedule. Thus, the only concern is that the young may have incentive
to misrepresent their ability. Given that information about type is revealed when young,
the planner can distinguish between retirees of the same generation. Thus, without loss
of generality, it is assumed that the tax on consumption of the old is pre-paid at the end
of the first period of life. Because retirees simply consume their after-tax savings, one
need not worry about the potential ratchet effect arising from disclosure of information
in the first period.4
Individuals derive utility from consumption when young and consumption during
retirement. Moreover, they are assumed to have a disutility of labor. All individuals
have a common utility function, assumed to be quasi-linear in labor supply, so that
preferences are represented by
V (c, x, l) = v(c, x)− l. (8)
The function v is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable at all (c, x) 6= (0, 0),
continuous and nondecreasing on R2+, strictly increasing on R2++, and strictly concave on
R2++ with v(0, 0) = 0, vc(0, x) =∞ for all x > 0, vx(c, 0) =∞ for all c > 0, vc(c, x)→ 0 as
c→∞ for all x ≥ 0, and vx(c, x)→ 0 as x→∞ for all c ≥ 0. The limiting assumptions
on v ensure that the optimal tax problem has a solution and that individuals of both
types have positive consumption of both goods at this solution.
Differences in ability generate differences in preferences over consumption and effective
labor, which, following Weymark (1987) are conveniently represented by the type-specific
monotonic transformation of (8)
U i(c, x, y) = aiv(c, x)− y. (9)
4See Dille´n and Lundholm (1996) for an exposition of a two-period model in which the taxation
authority sets an optimal linear tax schedule for workers who supply labor in both time periods. Apps
and Rees (2006), Berliant and Ledyard (2005), and Brett and Weymark (2008b) study nonlinear income
taxes with labor supply in two periods and the potential for a ratchet effect.
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Equation (9) describes preferences over variables that the planner can observe. This
representation is linear in both y and in the unobserved characteristic a. This linearity
is heavily exploited in the analysis of Section 3.
The taxation authority is assumed to select a tax system that specifies an amount of
tax to be paid on labor income, along with a levy on the amount of savings. Equivalently,
it can be modeled as choosing the consumption levels and effective labor time for each
type of worker at each date in time, subject to incentive compatibility constraints. I
analyze only the case in which a person of high ability may wish to misrepresent its type.
That is, at each date, only one form of self-selection constraints is considered, namely
a2v(c
t
2, x
t
2)− yt2 ≥ a2v(ct1, xt1)− yt1 t = 1, 2, . . . (10)
This is the case most commonly analyzed in the literature. Moreover, this is the form
of the self-selection constraint that can easily be shown to bind under the assumptions
used in Section 3 below.
3 Optimal Taxation In a Steady State
I consider only taxation in the steady state, defined as a state in which all variables
per worker of each type remain constant over time. At a steady state, the aggregate
resource constraint (6) reduces to
f(k, y)− nk = c1 + c2 + 1
1 + n
(x1 + x2), (11)
where variables without time superscripts denote steady state values.
The government is assumed to maximize a weighted sum of steady-state utilities5
W = α1[v(c1, x1)− l1] + α2[v(c2, x2)− l2]. (12)
The welfare function (12) is equivalent to the weighted average utilitarian criterion, where
the weights are over the two types. In order for the sum in (12) to be meaningful, the
5The total population size, N , can be incorporated into the welfare weights.
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utility function v must have cardinal significance. Welfare can be re-expressed in terms
of observable variables as
W = λ1[a1v(c1, x1)− y1] + λ2[a2v(c2, x2)− y2], (13)
where λi = αi/ai is the skill-normalized welfare weight assigned to individuals of type i.
I assume that λ1 > λ2, which implies that a redistribution of before-tax income (labor
supply) from individuals of type 1 to individuals of type 2 is always welfare improving.
Thus, the self-selection constraint (10) must bind at a solution to the planner’s problem.
In the steady state, this binding constraint is given by the equation
a2v(c2, x2)− y2 = a2v(c1, x1)− y1. (14)
Following Weymark (1986), I also assume that the skill-normalized welfare weights sum
to the number of types of individuals in the economy; that is,
λ1 + λ2 = 2. (15)
The Steady State Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Problem. The government chooses
an allocation (c1, c2, x1, x2, k, y1, y2) ∈ R7+ to maximize the social welfare function (13)
subject to the resource constraint (11) and the binding self-selection constraint (14).
In order to carry out any comparative static exercise, it is first necessary to show that
the problem at hand has a unique solution. Lemma 1 establishes that this is so for the
Steady State Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Problem.
Lemma 1. The Steady State Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Problem has a unique so-
lution.
The quasi-linear form of the utility function allows for a straightforward substitution
of the self-selection constraint (14) into the social welfare function. The result of this
substitution is summarized in the following Lemma.
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Lemma 2. Let (c˜1, c˜2, x˜1, x˜2, k˜, y˜1, y˜2) solve the Steady State Optimal Nonlinear Income
Tax Problem. Then (c˜1, c˜2, x˜1, x˜2, k˜, y˜) solves:
max
(c1,c2,x1,x2,k,y)
β1v(c1, x1) + β2v(c2, x2)− y subject to (11), (16)
where
β1 = λ1a1 + (1− λ1)(a2 − a1) (17)
and
β2 = a2. (18)
Brett and Weymark (2008c) call β1 and β2 the reduced form welfare weights. These
weights measure the marginal social value of an increase in the utility from consumption
(in either or both periods) of the individuals of the two types. The normalization λ1+λ2 =
2 and the assumptions that λ1 > λ2 and a2 > a1 imply that β2 > a1 > β1. The social
value of the utility of individuals of type 1 is less than the raw welfare weight a1 because
this utility brings with it added temptation for persons of type 2 to mimic those of type
1.6
Lemma 2 establishes that all of the components of the solution to the Steady State
Optimal Nonlinear Tax Problem, except the effective labor supplies, can be found by
solving the simpler maximization problem (16). The solution to (16) can be substituted
into the definition of aggregate effective labor and into (14) in order to compute the
effective labor supplies.7 Performing these substitutions yields Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. Let (c˜1, c˜2, x˜1, x˜2, k˜, y˜) solve (16). Then the solution to the Steady State
Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Problem is (c˜1, c˜2, x˜1, x˜2, k˜, y˜1, y˜2) where
y˜1 =
1
2
(y˜ − a2[v(c˜2, x˜2)− v(c˜1, x˜1)]) , (19)
6Weymark (1987, p. 1171) provides a detailed discussion justifying the exact form of the reduced
form welfare weight.
7One technical complication remains. There is no guarantee that the solution procedure outlined
here guarantees that y˜1 > 0. I assume this to be the case throughout the remainder of the analysis.
With this assumption, all elements of the optimal program can be shown to be positive.
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and
y˜2 =
1
2
(y˜ + a2[v(c˜2, x˜2)− v(c˜1, x˜1)]) . (20)
After introducing the variable µ to describe the shadow value of the constraint (11),
the solution to (16) can be easily described in terms of the following first-order conditions.
βivci − µ = 0, i = 1, 2; (21)
βivxi −
µ
1 + n
= 0, i = 1, 2; (22)
− 1 + µfy = 0; (23)
fk − n = 0. (24)
In fact, the solution is completely described by the necessary conditions (21)–(24) and
the resource constraint (11). It follows directly from (23) that µ˜ > 0. Moreover, the
qualitative properties of the optimal tax system, including its implied behavioral dis-
tortions, can be derived from equations (21)–(24). These properties are summarized in
Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. The following statements hold at the solution to the Steady State Optimal
Nonlinear Tax Problem.
(i) The rate of interest is equal to the biological rate of interest; that is, r˜ = fr(k˜, y˜) =
n.
(ii) There are no distortions in saving behavior; that is,
vc(c˜1, x˜1)
vx(c˜1, x˜1)
=
vc(c˜2, x˜2)
vx(c˜2, x˜2)
= (1 + n). (25)
(iii) The labor supply of individuals of type 2 is not distorted; that is,
MRS2,lc :=
1
vc(c˜2, x˜2)
= wa2. (26)
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(iv) The implicit marginal tax rate (IMTR) on the labor income of individuals of type
1 is positive; specifically,
IMTR1 := 1− 1
wa1vc(c˜1, x˜1)
= (λ1 − 1)
(
a2 − a1
a1
)
. (27)
Parts (i) and (ii) arise because the planner has no reason to distort savings decisions at
the margin. Because preferences are separable between consumption and labor supply,
low-productivity workers and high-productivity workers considering the possibility of
mimicking low-productivity workers are each willing to trade consumption across time
at the same implicit prices. Thus, the taxation authority can gain no informational
advantage by distorting this margin. Part (iii) is the traditional no distortion result for
workers of the higher type. Part (iv) implies that low-skilled individuals face a positive
implicit marginal tax rate. Naturally, the specific form of the marginal tax rate is similar
to the form found by Weymark (1987).8 An immediate consequence of (26) and (27) is
that changes in n have no effect on the optimal implicit marginal income tax rates faced
by both types of individuals.
4 The Effects of Aging on the Optimal Tax Schedule
In order to assess the effects of an aging population on the solution to the Steady
State Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Problem, it is necessary to describe how its solution
varies with the population growth parameter n. The lower the value of n, the larger is
the cohort of retirees relative to the cohort of workers. Proposition 2 establishes that it
is possible to carry out this comparative static analysis.
Proposition 2. The optimality conditions (11) and (21)–(24) define a continuously dif-
ferentiable solution function F : R+ → R7++ of the problem (16) with n 7→ (c˜1, x˜1, c˜2, x˜2, y˜, k˜, µ˜).
8Weymark (1987) does not give an explicit statement of the analogous result. However, combining
his equations (37) and (A.1) for any unbunched individuals yields a generalization of equation (A.8)
used in the proof of Proposition 1.
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For all n ∈ R+, the derivative DF of F at n is given by
DF (n) = (A−1b)(n), (28)
where
A(n) =

β1vc1c1 β1vc1x1 0 0 0 0 −1
β1vc1x1 β1vx1x1 0 0 0 0 −(1 + n)−1
0 0 β2vc2c2 β2vc2x2 0 0 −1
0 0 β2vc2x2 β2vx2x2 0 0 −(1 + n)−1
0 0 0 0 µfyy µfky fy
0 0 0 0 fky fkk 0
−1 −(1 + n)−1 −1 −(1 + n)−1 fy 0 0

(29)
and
b(n) =

0
−(1 + n)−2µ˜
0
−(1 + n)−2µ˜
0
1
k˜ − (1 + n)−2x˜

, (30)
and where all expressions on the right-hand sides of (29) and (30) are evaluated at the
solution to (16).
Equations (28)–(30) characterize, albeit opaquely, how the optimal allocation changes
in response to a change in the rate of population growth. As is shown in the proof of
Proposition 2, the structure of the matrix A(n) makes it possible to derive an explicit
formula for its inverse. This formula, in turn, can be used to derive expressions for the
terms in (28). These expressions are contained in Corollaries 1–4 below.
Corollary 1. There exists numbers ∆1,∆2,∆f > 0 and θ < 0 such that
dµ˜
dn
= θ
[
2∑
i=1
{
µ˜
∆i(1 + n)2
(
vcici
1 + n
− vcixi
)}
− µ˜
∆f
fyfky
]
− θ
[
k˜ − x˜
(1 + n)2
]
. (31)
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Moreover, if x is (in the neighborhood of the initial optimum) a normal good for each
individual and (1 + n)2k˜ > x˜ then
dµ˜
dn
> 0.
Corollary 1 shows that the sign of the effect of n on shadow value of the resource
constraint is, in general, ambiguous. Normality of x is sufficient to sign the first term in
(31). The greater source of ambiguity is the final term, which captures the direct effect of
a change in n on the steady state resource constraint. As in all overlapping generations
models, an increase in n has both a capital spreading effect, as more workers arrive to
work with the existing capital stock, and a reduced dependency effect, as the relative
number of retirees falls. While Meijdam and Verbon (1997) are able to sign the relative
magnitudes of the capital spreading and dependency effects in their model of public
pensions supported by lump-sum taxation, it does not appear possible to do so in the
current second-best framework. The condition expressed in the Corollary posits that the
capital spreading effect is stronger than the dependency effect. It is, however, possible for
the optimal µ to increase with n when the dependency effect dominates capital spreading,
provided the dependency effect does not also outweigh the first term in (31). It follows
from (3) and (23) that µ˜ = 1/w˜. Hence, the shadow value of the resource constraint
varies inversely with the aggregate wage rate at the optimum. It seems plausible to
expect that an increase in n, which raises the supply of workers, decreases the aggregate
wage rate. If this is so, then it is plausible that µ˜ increases with n.
At the solution to the Steady State Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Problem, the
marginal net social value of consumption when young is equal to the marginal social
cost of acquiring the resources to finance that consumption, µ˜. As Corollary 1 shows, an
increase in n typical changes the marginal social cost of consumption. For concreteness,
suppose that µ˜ increases. Then, there exists an incentive to economize on the now socially
more expensive consumption, and one might expect the optimal consumption when young
to fall for all individuals. This intuition must be modified, however, if preferences over
consumption are not additive across time periods. The taxation authority can restore
the balance between the marginal benefits and marginal costs of consumption by any
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combination of changes in c and x that produce an appropriate increase in the marginal
social value of consumption when young. Corollary 2 provides a formal summary of this
discussion.
Corollary 2. For the same ∆1,∆2 > 0 as in Corollary 1,
dc˜i
dn
=
1
∆i
[(
(vxixi −
vcixi
1 + n
)
dµ˜
dn
+
µ˜vcixi
(1 + n)2
]
, i = 1, 2. (32)
Moreover, if (in the neighborhood of the initial optimum) vcixi = 0 then
dc˜i
dn
has the
opposite sign of
dµ˜
dn
, for i = 1, 2.
An increase in n has two, potentially offsetting, effects on the marginal social cost of
consumption in retirement. Because the socially optimal interest rate equals the rate of
population growth, an increase in n lowers the opportunity cost of x. In other words, the
reduced dependency effect makes the consumption of retirees relatively less expensive. On
the other hand, if the social value of resources µ˜ increases with n, then all consumption,
including consumption in retirement, becomes more socially expensive. The net effect
on the opportunity cost of x is ambiguous.9 Thus, it is impossible to sign the effect of
an increase in n on x. Corollary 3 gives an algebraic rendering of the ambiguous effect
of n on the optimal consumption in retirement.
Corollary 3. For the same ∆1,∆2 > 0 as in Corollary 1,
dx˜i
dn
=
1
∆i
[(
(−vcixi +
vcici
1 + n
)
dµ˜
dn
− µ˜vcici
(1 + n)2
]
, i = 1, 2. (33)
It is possible to sign the effect of n on xi when vcixi is sufficiently small and the
dependency effect is sufficiently large (or x sufficiently inferior for the other type of
individual) that µ˜ decreases with n. In this case, the marginal social cost of xi falls and
the only effective way to reduce the marginal social benefit commensurately is to increase
xi.
It is impossible to sign the effects of an increase in n on the production side of the
economy. Corollary 4 displays the potentially offsetting terms.
9Formally, both the numerator and denominator in the final term on the left-hand side of (22) increase.
14
Corollary 4. For the same ∆f > 0 as in Corollary 1,
dy˜
dn
=
1
∆f
[
−fkkfy dµ˜
dn
− µ˜fky
]
, (34)
and
dk˜
dn
=
1
∆f
[
fkyfy
dµ˜
dn
+ µ˜fyy
]
. (35)
An increase in the rate of population growth induces an increase in the rate of interest
at the optimum. This increase in the rate of interest can be brought about by either a
decrease in the capital stock or an increase in aggregate effective labor.10 Without further
restrictions on technology, it is impossible to tell which of these levers the taxation
authority would pull. Ambiguity on the production side of the economy disappears when
the dependency effect is sufficiently strong (or x sufficiently inferior) so the µ˜ decreases
with n. In this event, both capital and aggregate effective labor are optimally reduced
in the steady state.
Table 1 collects the results of this analysis for the special case of utility that is additive
across time. The results are re-phrased in terms of a decrease in n in order that they
may cast direct light on the effects of population aging on the solution to the Steady
State Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Problem. The results are most clear-cut when
the dependency effect is very strong near the initial optimum. In that case, population
aging leads to a decrease in optimal consumption in each period for all individuals, to
an increase in the steady state capital stock, and to an increase in aggregate effective
labor. Moreover, the steady state aggregate wage falls, so that labor supply must increase
for at least one type of individual. Nevertheless, the optimal implicit marginal tax rate
remains unchanged. When the dependency effect is more muted, consumption when
young increases for workers of both types, as does the aggregate wage, while the optimal
implicit marginal tax rate remains unchanged. It is not possible to sign the directions of
change in any other variables.
10Linear homogeneity and strict concavity of f imply fky > 0.
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Table 1: The effects of a decrease in n when utility is additive across time
Direction of the effect of a decrease in n
Variable Weak dependency effect (dµ˜
dn
> 0) Strong dependence effect (dµ˜
dn
< 0)
c˜i increase decrease
x˜i ambiguous decrease
k˜ ambiguous increase
y˜ ambiguous increase
w˜ increase decrease
IMTR no change no change
5 Concluding Remarks
The rate of population growth affects both the consumption and production sides of
the model economy presented in this article. The real price of consumption in retirement
is directly affected by the demographic make-up of the population, and the optimal
aggregate wage rate is indirectly affected by the relative numbers of workers and retirees.
For some goods and some initial configurations, the price and wage effects reinforce
one another; for others, they offset. The results presented in this article identify the
competing forces and give them a precise formulation. Moreover, the structure of the
matrix A presented in Proposition 2 makes it apparent how to generalize the results to
an arbitrary, finite number of skill-types.
It is striking that the implicit marginal income tax rate faced by low-skill workers is
invariant to the rate of population growth. However, this result is easily reconciled with
the finding by Weymark (1987) and Brett and Weymark (2008a) that for an arbitrary
finite number of skill-types, optimal marginal income tax rates depend only on the dis-
tribution of skills and the relative welfare weights when preferences are quasi-linear in
leisure. Using the same class of preferences, a continuum of skill types and a utilitarian
objective, Boadway et al. (2000) find that optimal marginal income tax rates depend
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only on the distribution of skills. Thus, the invariance result presented here is, in part,
an artifact of the form of preferences, but also a consequence of exogenous relative wages.
A natural extension to this work would be an analysis with endogenous relative wages.
The model of Pirttila¨ and Tuomala (2001) could serve as a natural starting point. There
are several challenges posed by such an extension. There is the obvious task of describing
how changes in demographics might change relative wages. There is also the technical
challenge of analyzing the Weymark model without recourse to skill-normalized welfare
weights, because it is inappropriate to impose a normalization rule containing endoge-
nous variables. Moreover, even when preferences are separable between consumption
and leisure, there may exist a motivation for capital market distortions in the Pirttila¨–
Tuomala model. It is not immediately obvious, but potentially worthwhile to find out,
how these distortions respond to demographic change.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Solving (14) for a2v(c2, x2) and substituting into (13) yields
W = λ1a1v(c1, x1)− λ1y1 + λ2[a2v(c1, x1)− y1 + y2]− λ2y2. (A.1)
Employing the normalization λ1 + λ2 = 2 along with (A.1) yields
W = λ1a1v(c1, x1) + (1− λ1)a2v(c1, x1) + a2v(c1, x1)− 2y1. (A.2)
Solving (14) for a2v(c1, x1) and substituting into the penultimate term in (A.2) yields,
W = [λ1a1 + (1− λ1)a2]v(c1, x1) + a2v(c2, x2)− y1 − y2. (A.3)
Thus, the Steady State Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Problem is equivalent to maxi-
mizing the objective (A.3) subject to the constraint (11). The curvature and boundary
conditions on v and f guarantee a unique solution for the vector (c1, c2, x1, x2, k, y1 +y2).
I show in Lemma 3 how to compute unique solution values of y1 and y2 from the uniquely
determined (c1, c2, x1, x2, k, y).
17
Proof of Lemma 2. Rearranging (A.3) yields
W = [a1 + (1− λ1)(a2 − a1)]v(c1, x1) + a2v(c2, x2)− y. (A.4)
Substituting (17) and (18) into (A.4) yields (16). In so doing, one constraint appearing
in the Steady State Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Problem has been substituted into
its objective, and the variables y1 and y2 have been eliminated. However, the variable y
is inserted and the constraint (11) remains. The Lemma follows.
Proof of Lemma 3. In light of (14), the effective labor supplies can be found by solving
the following linear system in the variables y1 and y2.
y1 + y2 = y˜
−y1 + y2 = a2 [v(c˜2, x˜2)− v(c˜1, x˜1)] .
(A.5)
It is easy to check that (19) and (20) give the solution to the system (A.5).
Proof of Proposition 1. Part (i) follows directly from equations (3) and (24). Part (ii)
follows from dividing (21) by (22) for individuals of each type. By (23),
µ =
1
fy
. (A.6)
Part (iii) follows from substituting (A.6) and (18) into (21) for individuals of type 2 and
rearranging.
Using (3) in conjunction with the definition of IMTR1 given in (27) yields
IMTR1 = 1− 1
a1fyvc(c˜1, x˜1)
. (A.7)
Substituting (A.6) and (21) into (A.7) yields
IMTR1 = 1− 1a1
β1
=
a1 − β1
a1
. (A.8)
Recalling the definition of β1 from (17) and rearranging yields (27).
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Proof of Proposition 2. By Lemma 1, the first order necessary conditions define a solution
function. Differentiating the first order conditions and the resource constraint yields
A
[
dc1 dx1 dc2 dx2 dy dk dµ
]>
= b dn, (A.9)
where dependence on the parameter n is now expunged from the notation. The first zero
in the final line of (29) follows from (24). In order to establish the Proposition, it suffices
to show that the matrix A is invertible. To that end, introduce the partition
A =
H p
p> 0
 , (A.10)
where H is the upper 6 × 6 block of A, p is a column of length 6 containing all but the
last element of the seventh column of A, and the zero in (A.10) is a scalar.
The matrix H is block-diagonal. I now show that each of its blocks is invertible, so
that H−1 exists.11 Specifically,
H =

H1 0 0
0 H2 0
0 0 Hf
 −→ H−1 =

H−11 0 0
0 H−12 0
0 0 H−1f
 , (A.11)
where each block in the partition of H is 2 × 2 and
H−1i =
1
βi
(
vcicivxixi − v2cixi
)
 vxixi −vcixi
−vcixi vcici
 := 1
∆i
 vxixi −vcixi
−vcixi vcici
 , i = 1, 2,
(A.12)
and
H−1f =
1
µ
(
fyyfkk − f 2ky
)
 fkk −µfky
−fky µfyy
 := 1
∆f
 fkk −µfky
−fky µfyy
 . (A.13)
Strict concavity of v and f imply that ∆i > 0, i = 1, 2, f . Indeed, the curvature properties
imply that H is negative-definite.
11The calculations presented here are more than the minimum required to prove the Proposition.
However, they are needed later on.
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It is straightforward to check that12
A−1 =
H−1 − θH−1pp>H−1 θH−1p
θp>H−1 −θ
 , (A.14)
where
θ =
1
p>H−1p
. (A.15)
Incidentally, because H is negative-definite, so is H−1; therefore, θ < 0.
Proof of Corollary 1. Using the bottom line of (A.14), (28) and (30) yields
dµ
dn
= θ
[
−1 −(1 + n)−1 −1 −(1 + n)−1 fy 0
]
H−1

0
− µ
(1+n)2
0
− µ
(1+n)2
0
1

− θ [k − (1 + n)−2x] .
(A.16)
Substituting (A.11)–(A.13) into (A.16) and performing the matrix multiplication gives
(31).
Normality of x implies that the terms inside the summation sign on the right-hand
side of (31) are negative. Linear homogeneity of f implies that fy is homogeneous of
degree zero. Hence, by Euler’s Theorem
yfyy + kfky = 0. (A.17)
But fyy < 0, so fky > 0. Hence, the entire expression inside the square bracket is negative
when x is normal. Because θ < 0, the first term is positive. Clearly, (1 + n)2k > x is
sufficient for the final term to be positive as well.
12See Intriligator (1971, p. 158) for an analogous calculation in the context of consumer theory.
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Proof of Corollaries 2–4. It is possible to use equations (A.11)–(A.14) to directly com-
pute the results presented in Corollaries 2–4. However, it is instructive to use a more
heuristic solution method. The top six lines of (A.9) can be written
H

dc1
dx1
dc2
dx2
dy
dk

=

dµ
(1 + n)−1dµ− (1 + n)−2µdn
dµ
(1 + n)−1dµ− (1 + n)−2µdn
−fydµ
dn

. (A.18)
Given the block-diagonal structure of H, (A.18) can be decomposed into the following
three matrix equations,
Hi
dci
dxi
 =
 dµ
(1 + n)−1dµ− (1 + n)−2µdn
 , i = 1, 2;
Hf
dy
dk
 =
−fydµ
dn
 .
(A.19)
Using (A.12) and (A.13) to compute the solutions to the equations (A.19) givesdci
dxi
 = 1
∆i
 vxixidµ− (1 + n)−1vcixidµ+ (1 + n)−2vcixiµdn
−vcixidµ+ (1 + n)−1vcicidµ− (1 + n)−2vciciµdn
 (A.20)
and dy
dk
 = 1
∆f
−fkkfydµ− µfkydn
fkyfydµ+ µfyydn
 . (A.21)
Equations (32)–(35) follow from “dividing” the appropriate entries in (A.20) and (A.21)
through by dn.
The final sentence of Corollary 2 is immediate.
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